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Abstract 
Economic insights on the provision of public goods and services by public sector 
organizations went hand in hand with probing questions on the efficient allocation of 
resources within them concerning neo-classical assumptions on the theory of firm 
(Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). The rationale behind the unprecedented 
divergences from the neo-classical firm postulations on the basis of not-to-operate at 
the efficient production frontier has attracted attentions of researchers working not 
only on the private firms but also on the public sector. This paper investigates 
theoretical underpinnings of efficient allocation of resources within public sector 
organizations on the basis of a variety of arguments. Before examining the (in) 
efficient usage of resources in the public sector that is mostly based on the theory of 
bureaucracy, methodological and practical challenges to measure the efficiency 
performances of public intuitions are visited. Subsequently, institutional framework 
on the public provision of goods and services is scrutinised referring particularly to 
the discussion on incentive schemes and efficiency.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic insights on the provision of public goods and services by public sector 
organizations went hand in hand with probing questions on the efficient allocation of 
resources within them concerning neo-classical assumptions on the theory of firm 
(Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). The rationale behind the unprecedented 
divergences from the neo-classical firm postulations on the basis of not-to-operate at 
the efficient production frontier has attracted attentions of researchers working not 
only on the private firms but also on the public sector.  
This paper investigates theoretical underpinnings of efficient allocation of 
resources within public sector organizations on the basis of a variety of arguments. 
Before examining the (in) efficient usage of resources in the public sector that is 
mostly based on the theory of bureaucracy, methodological and practical challenges 
to measure the efficiency performances of public intuitions are visited. Subsequently, 
institutional framework on the public provision of goods and services is scrutinised 
referring particularly to the discussion on incentive schemes and efficiency. 
The outline of this paper is as follows: section II explores the theoretical 
framework for the efficiency of public sector organizations, section III illuminates the 
efficiency of government output based on the theory of bureaucracy including earlier 
sociological and economic researches to the contemporary debates, section IV 
demonstrates the institutional foundations of the allocation of resources in the public 
sector referring chiefly to the incentive-efficiency dichotomy and section V 
concludes. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 
Efficiency analyses of public provision of goods and services have often been 
intellectually stimulated by competing views on the function and boundaries of state 
intervention into the economic sphere. Although provision of social services by 
governments became a significant phenomenon during the modern age especially 
after the establishment of nation states (Rosanvallon, 2000), discussions on the 
appropriate role of governments in the society are as old as Plato’s The Republic. The 
accumulated literature on this particular theme can be mainly classified into two 
streams as Besley (2011) points out clearly below: 
“(…) One emphasises government in the public interest. It outlines the range of 
activities that government can undertake to improve the lives of its citizens. 
Government provides underpinnings of the market system by establishing property 
rights and a means of adjudication through the courts. (…) The logic behind this has 
been developed at length and provides the modern theory of state from a welfare 
economic point of view. 
At the other extreme are accounts of government seen mainly as a private interest. 
Government can be a focus for rent seeking in which the power to tax results in 
private, wasteful efforts to capture the state which then rewards the powerful at the 
expense of citizens at large (…)” (Besley, 2011: 1-2). 	    
 Even though efficiency of public provision of goods and services forms a 
relatively younger literature in the microeconomics, the economics of public sector 
organizations has already become a distinct branch namely Public Finance within the 
discipline of economics for many years. Besley’s (2011) noteworthy taxonomy above 
would be extremely helpful to grasp the fundamentals of this particular sub-division 
of economics. Due to the fact that this research is carried out to investigate the 
efficiency of public sector organizations, this section will deal with the efficiency 
literature afterwards. So as to examine an extensive literature on the economics of 
public sector, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) can be visited. As a final point before 
moving towards to the central arguments, albeit this research takes the efficiency 
analysis of public institutions into the centre of its analysis, it needs to be stated here 
that further objectives of public sector organizations such as fairness, equality, 
consumer protection, poverty reduction and creating employment opportunities 
(instead of providing employment benefits) are still valid and preserve their 
significance.  
        Increasing awareness among the decision makers in the governmental bodies in 
relation to the efficient allocation of resources within public sector organizations has 
encouraged and expanded academic inquiry for the last three decades in this particular 
field (Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 1997). The motivation behind this growing 
sensitivity between government authorities is highly associated with the fact that 
inefficiencies may “suggest that public service resources could be better used 
elsewhere in the economy, or that more outputs could be generated within the public 
services without additional resources” as well as “undermine the public's support for 
tax funding of public services” (Smith and Street, 2005). Thus, researches attempting 
to measure the efficiencies of public sector organizations have been used as policy-
reflection papers alongside with their academic contributions and insights even 
though they haven’t received sufficient attentions as put forward by Duncombe, 
Miner, and Ruggiero (1997). 
The major concern of the studies on this area of research is “to measure the 
relative efficiency of different public organizations providing the same public 
service” (Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 2005). Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (2005) puts forward 
two different approaches for the measurement. In the former approach, a set of partial 
measures of performance is developed with the aim of understanding the behavior of 
the organization. On the other hand, the latter one aims to define a “general index” to 
reveal the efficiency of the organization. Therefore, the first method indicates local 
efficiency performances, whereas the second one sets forth global efficiency 
indicators. The most common and methodologically accepted efficiency indicators are 
mostly departing from the second cohort of indicators using a variety of approaches 
including parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric models (Stone, 2002). 
 Measuring efficiency performances of public sector organizations is noticeably 
harder than their private counterparts as they “produce goods that are provided either 
free at the point of use or at a price that is not determined by market forces”(IFS 
Report, 2002) as well as the “non-tradable nature of goods and services” supplied by 
them (Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 2005). Accordingly, price mechanism in the public 
sector does not function well enough vis a vis the conventional market procedures that 
are expected to ensure and sustain the efficient allocation of resources. That is to say, 
“signaling” in the market mechanism is highly probable to be substituted by the 
discretionary actions of the players in the political arena that would cause 
inefficiencies as far as the production process is concerned. 
In addition to the inherent problems of the public sector concerning political 
manipulation on the provision of welfare services, ill-defined nature of property rights 
within them lead actors in the public service to act in reluctant ways on the allocation 
of resources. And accordingly “the allocation of public resources is governed by a 
political process which usually does not follow the price mechanism” (Kang, 1997). 
The political and social constraints, in lieu of market based constraints, on the 
publicly provided goods and services result in inefficient allocation of resources as 
well. Besides, the lack of competition and the “monopolistic nature of public 
production” prevent the actors in the public sector organizations to be cautious about 
the efficient usage of resources compared to their competitors in the private sector 
(Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 2005). 
Over and above the previous arguments on the nature of public sector outputs that 
would cause inefficiencies, the objective function of public sector organizations needs 
to be touched in this section as well. Unlike private companies, public organizations 
are assumed to take the “equity goals” into consideration as one of their fundamental 
functions in the modern societies corresponds to the redistribution of income 
(Tullock, 1997).  Thus, while conducting efficiency analysis on publicly run 
institutions and proposing policy recommendations, one should be careful about the 
contradicting nature of the efficiency-equity dichotomy in the objective function of 
public institutions (Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 2005).  
As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, outputs produced in the public sector 
organizations either in police, post office, health sector and courts is questioned 
concerning their performance in productivity and efficiency. Chong et al. (2012) 
claimed that the reasons behind the lower productivity and efficiency figures in public 
sector can be summed up as “inferior outputs, including human and physical capital, 
technology, and poor management”. Moreover, Lewis (2004) and Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007) stated that the poor public sector management is mostly motivated by 
lack of incentives, supervision and monitoring. Consequently, the statements on poor 
management in the public sector encourage comprehensive investigation on 
bureaucracy that backbones the organizational structure in the public sector 
organizations.  
The economic insights on the bureaucracy studies are mostly centred on the 
fundamental question investigating to what extent efficient or inefficient usage of 
resources are linked to the managerial performances of bureaucrats as well as are 
comprised predominantly of budget size (Downs, 1965; Niskanen, 1971), slack 
maximisation (Migue and Belanger, 1974) and expenditure choices (Williamson, 
1964) models. Moreover, since Migue and Belanger (1974) extended Niskanen 
(1971)’s assumption of technical inefficiency in the public sector by incorporating 
allocative inefficiency into the model, the number of empirical researches measuring 
both technical and allocative efficiencies of public sector organizations have boosted 
apparently. That is to say, the aforementioned papers on the economic theory of 
bureaucracy had paved the way for the current empirical researches to conduct 
efficiency analysis on public sector organizations.  
Following the erstwhile theoretical approaches to the efficiency of public sector 
influenced mostly by the theory of bureaucracy, empirical papers first started with 
Hayes and Chang (1990), Davis and Hayes (1993) and Grosskopf and Hayes (1993) 
employing parametric techniques as well as Chalos and Cherian (1995) and 
Duncombe, Miner and Ruggiero (1997) that opt for conducting non-parametric 
methods. And currently, these studies become a distinct area of research (Stone, 2002; 
Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 2005). To these researches, efficiency of public sector 
institutions is highly contingent upon certain institutional and environmental factors 
that vary between organizations (Kang, 1997), which apparently encourages to 
examine the determinants of possible inefficiencies in the Turkish public higher 
education by taking the earlier literature into consideration.  
III. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF BUREAUCRACY and EFFICIENCY 
OF GOVERNMENT OUTPUT 
Public sector employees, who are also called as bureaucrats, form the backbone of 
the major part of public sector analyses particularly when the allocation of resources 
in the public sector organizations is questioned. Hence, the efficient or inefficient 
allocation of resources to provide certain services to the public has often been 
examined on the basis of budget choices made by bureaucrats (McNutt, 2002:124). 
This section critically summarises the fundamental insights and discussions on the 
bureaucracy starting from Weberian (1947) analysis and Niskanen’s (1971) theory of 
bureaucracy to public choice interpretation of it and ending up with current debates on 
the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.  
Earlier Research on Bureaucracy 
The preliminary researches on the bureaucracy that were mainly intensified 
around sociological paradigms are inspired from Weber’s (1947) seminal work 
centred principally on German example.  In his piece, Weber’s first and foremost aim 
was to put forward certain set of ideal characteristics for each and every bureaucratic 
mechanism including profit-maximising firms (McNutt, 2002:124). Moreover, he was 
also trying to create the most appropriate way of management in organizations to 
assure that a staff can enhance her technical competence as well as apply it to the 
certain practical cases. Weber’s (1947) ideals for a well-functioning bureaucracy can 
be enumerated as “hierarchy, unity of command, specialization of labour, 
employment and promotion based on merit, full-time employment, decisions based on 
impersonal rules, the importance of documentation and a separation between the 
bureaucrats’ work-life and private life”. These aforementioned characteristics still 
influence modern conception of bureaucracy and stimulated the formation of vast 
literature in this particular area of research (Aucoin, 1995: 157).  
Following the early sociological analysis of bureaucracy introduced by Max 
Weber, economic insights on bureaucracy initially commenced with the works of 
Tullock (1965), Downs (1965) and Niskanen (1971). All three authors were in search 
of figuring out the modes of “relations between people within an organisation in 
receipt of a recurrent block of funds” (McNutt, 2002:124). And eventually, their 
theoretical conclusions had formed the mainstream understanding in microeconomic 
research for many years. In this sub-section, Downs’ approach to bureaucracy is 
stated briefly below; Niskanen and Tullock will be discussed in the subsequent sub-
sections respectively. 
Downs’ (1965) fundamental assumption for bureaucrats is that they are solely 
motivated by their own self-interests like any other agent in the society. Hence, rather 
than specifying public interests, they prefer to maximise their utilities when they are 
performing in the bureau. Furthermore, to Downs, an organization can be defined as 
bureau if a) it is sufficiently large b) a majority of the employment consists of full-
time workers c) hiring, promotion and retention base upon some sort of assessment d) 
the significant share of “its output is not directly or indirectly evaluated in any 
markets to the organization” (Downs, 1965). And subsequently, he indicates that the 
“non-market orientation” for bureaucratic outputs prevents an “objective monetary 
measure of profitability”, which results in larger bureau sizes alongside with 
reluctance towards efficient usage of resources. As a final point, it needs to be stated 
here that Downs’ preliminary analysis was rather influential on the further 
bureaucracy analysis particularly on Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy.     
Three Models of Utility-Maximising Bureaucracy 
Utility-maximising notion for managerial structures including bureaucracy has 
widely been used in the economics literature concentrating particularly on three 
different models: a) Budget Maximisation b) Slack Maximisation c) Expense 
Preference. The following paragraphs articulate these models separately. 
Budget Maximisation 
Niskanen (1971) coined the budget-maximising model for bureaucracy stating that 
bureaucrats are willing to increase the level of production until it reaches the largest 
amount of budget. The basic reason behind this attitude is that “bureaucrats do not 
have property rights to the fiscal residuum of the bureau” which corresponds to the 
difference between social costs and benefits incurred in the provision of services 
(Kang, 1997). That is to say, bureaucrats prefer producing the goods and services 
above their social optimum to utilise the remaining portion with an eye to enhance 
their position within the institution they work in (Downs, 1965; Niskanen, 1971).   
Niskanen (1971) developed a demand function for output of bureau that is shown 
below on the basis of the assumption that demand and cost functions are linear. 
                                         𝑀𝑅 = 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑄                                                          (1.1) 
where MR is the marginal revenue of the bureau and Q represents the amount of 
output provided by bureau. Hence, the total revenue becomes: 
                                               𝑇𝑅 = 𝑎𝑄 − 2𝑏𝑄!                                                      (1.2) 
and the total cost and marginal cost are narrated as: 
                                      𝑇𝐶 = 𝑐𝑄 + 𝑑𝑄!, 𝑀𝐶 = 𝑐 + 2𝑑𝑄                                      (1.3) 
The profit-maximising output of the bureau can be shown based upon conventional 
microeconomics analysis where MR=MC: 
                                               Q! = a− c /  2(b− d)                                            (1.4) 
Niskanen’s (1971) hypothesis claims that bureaucrat does not choose the point where 
profit is being maximised as in (2.4) but her own budget is being maximised shown 
below in (2.5) as long as bureaucrat’s budget line permits that output level†:                                                                                                             Q! = a− c /(b− d)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1.5)	  
The budget-maximising model developed by Niskanen received a fundamental 
criticism from Migue and Belanger (1974) on its very assumption that public sector 
operates technically efficient but may not be allocatively efficient. They criticised this 
assumption and relax it with the statement that public sector may both be technically 
and allocatively inefficient and eventually established a slack-maximising model that 
will be scrutinised subsequently.   
Slack Maximisation 
Migue and Belanger (1974) expanded the economic theory of bureaucracy by 
disproving the Niskanen’s (1971) ironic approach stating that bureaucrats’ only 
motivation is to increase the amount of budget they have and if this is right “then, no 
expenses other than those contributing to productivity are incurred since these would 
compete with output” (Kang, 1997). In contrary to the Niskanen’s conclusions, they 
argue that bureaucrats will opt for the point on the budget line where marginal rate of 
substitution among the output of bureau and other expenses is equal to the slope of the 
budget line (Migue and Belanger, 1974). Therefore, the relative prices of output and 
other expenses become the significant subject of analysis in lieu of maximum amount 
of attainable output on the budget line.  
The argument between Migue and Belanger (1974) and Niskanen’s (1971) models 
of bureaucracy is examined by Wyckoff (1990) leaning on four separate empirical 
predictions on the basis of “utility-based model of bureaucratic choice”. The author 
argues, “slack-maximizing and budget-maximizing bureaucracies are similar in their 
response to changes in cost and in their generation of ‘flypaper effects’, but they 
differ in their responses to matching and lump-sum grants”. In relation to the efficient 
usage of resources, budget maximization causes technical inefficiency as it leads over 
provision and cost efficiency; slack maximization creates allocative inefficiency, due 
to under-provision, and cost inefficiency (Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 1997). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
† For further discussions, see Niskanen (1968, 1971) and Kang (1997) 
Expense Preference 
In addition to the budget and slack-maximising models, Williamson (1964) 
initiated expense preference model to explain why bureaucrats are inclined to produce 
above the expected minimum cost level, which results in cost inefficiencies in the 
public sector organizations. Kang (1997) argues that Williamson (1964) meant in the 
expense preference model, “Managers do not have a neutral attitude toward all classes 
of expenses. Instead some types of have positive values attached to them”. Thus, so as 
to “enhance individual and collective objectives of managers”, certain types of 
expenses such as staff are incurred in higher amounts even though they do not have 
any impact on productivity and efficiency in the organization (Kang, 1997). In other 
words, if this is the case, cost function of a given public institution is expected to be 
highly correlated with labour expenses as well as staff characteristics (which causes 
higher labour expenses) would have an impact on the efficiency performances.  
Following the arguments put forward in Williamson’s (1964) paper, De Alessi 
(1969) reveals an inter-temporal dynamic of bureaucrat’s expenditure preferences that 
leads the current amount of expenditures to rise above the optimum. Unlike private 
companies, De Alessi (1969) argues, government favours using lower discount rates, 
which result in overinvestment in the public sector organizations due to the 
overestimation of the benefits yielded from current investments. And accordingly, 
managers in the government institutions have an incentive to increase the amount of 
present investments rather than waiting for prospective ones (Kang, 1997).     
Public Choice Theory and Bureaucracy 
Tullock (1965) has the pioneering work on the public choice model of 
bureaucracy that had an obvious impact on the Niskanen’s (1971) budget-maximising 
assumption of bureaucrats.  Prior to the Tullock’s economic analysis of bureaucracy, 
the sociological theories were manifesting themselves in this subject inspiring from 
Weber’s model (1947) that was reluctant to the economic behaviours of bureaucrats. 
According to the public choice thinkers, actors in the political sphere comprised of 
voters, politicians and bureaucrats perform their acts concerning conventional free 
market procedure, which is also known as catallaxy. Therefore, as far as public choice 
theory is concerned, bureaucrats are expected to maximise their utility levels either 
exploiting the monetary gains or enjoying higher status in the organization (Tullock 
and Buchanan, 1965). 
Tullock’s (1965) particular hypothesis is centred on the growth of bureaucracy 
and output of bureaus from a dynamic or inter-temporal perspective. In his research, 
he concluded, “through time, bureaucracy grows in size and did not remain at initial 
size” (McNutt, 2003:143). He proposed a growth function of the budget for a given 
bureau depending on time as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  B!!! = B!  exp(r!)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1.6)	  
where B!!! represents the budget size at time period (t+1), B! refers to the budget size 
at time period t. Additionally, r corresponds to the magnitude of growth in the 
bureaucracy. Hence, as the time passes, the budget size is expected to grow referring 
to the fact that relatively older public institutions would experience higher 
inefficiencies as compared to their younger equivalents. This model also indicates that 
bureaucrats are desperately keen to increase the total amount of budget allocated to 
their bureaus as this increases their discretionary power over certain expenses that are 
more preferable to them (Williamson, 1964).  
In the following discussions within public choice theory, Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) as well as Mueller (1989) take one step further by incorporating tax base 
analysis into the budgetary preferences of bureaus. To these researchers, “if a citizen 
expected bureaucrats to maximise their budgets, they would constrain their ability” by 
imposing a limit on the tax base through certain legislative attempts (McNutt, 
2002:145,146). Therefore, the extent of budget size is not merely contingent upon the 
preferences of bureaucrats but also citizenry constraints concerning the level of 
taxation are highly influential determinants of budget size in public sector 
organizations (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Mueller, 1989).      
Alternative Perspectives on Bureaucracy 
       Over and above the models developed to illustrate the economic underpinnings of 
the theory of bureaucracy that became a mainstream reference point for the current 
literature, some theoretical alternatives will be shown in this sub-section so as to 
extend and expand the reasoned discussions on the (in) efficient allocation of 
resources within public sector.  
Dunleavy’s Model of Bureau Shaping 
       Unlike the previous papers on the bureaucracy, Dunleavy (1991) assumes that the 
main motivation for bureaucrats is not pecuniary gains (although they have 
significance) but non-pecuniary ones including “status and prestige” and the “intrinsic 
value of the work involved” (McNutt, 2002:150).  To clarify this, he argues that: 
“There is always a pecuniary parameter in bureaucrats concerns (...). But this is 
unlikely to be a constraint which is surmounted relatively easily and thereafter is not 
very influential positively or negatively in structuring individual behaviour especially 
when officials are making policy decisions” (Dunleavy, 1991:201).  Hence, 
bureaucrats are expected to maximise their utilities through exploiting full-control to 
shape their bureaus rather than maximising the sizes of their budgets. 
        To Dunleavy, bureaus are shaped by a number of policy-decisions consisting of 
major internal reorganisations to promote policy work over routine activities, 
transformations of internal work practices, redefinition of relations with external 
partners to enhance policy contacts, competition with other bureau to protect the 
scope of interesting work, load shedding, hiving off and contracting out functions 
which are seen as undesirable (Dunleavy, 1991:203-204). The main conclusion 
derived from Dunleavy’s bureau-shaping model can be summed up in two 
propositions: “Firstly, budget maximising will be more likely in bureaus where the 
core budget makes up most or all of the program budget, i.e. in delivery, regulatory, 
taxing, trading and servicing bureaus. And secondly, other types of self-interested 
behaviour by senior bureaucrats will influence the activities of bureaus” (Dollery and 
Hamburger, 1995). 
Bureaus with Monopolistic Power 
        This sub-section is devised to reveal the arguments claiming that bureaucrats 
benefit from the monopolistic power of their bureaus in providing the public goods to 
the citizens. McNutt (2003) treats the bureau to act as a private monopolistic firm that 
chooses to provide the given public good at ‘MC=MR’ in lieu of the social optimum 
point at ‘MC=AR’. So as to exploit monopolistic profits, bureaucrats are supposed to 
prefer operating at the former point on the basis of “monopoly bureau output” model.  
         As illustrated in the Figure-2.1, instead of producing at the socially optimum 
level where MC curve intersects to demand curve (represents AR curve as well) as 
proposed by Niskanen (1971), McNutt (2003) claims that monopolistic bureau is 
inclined to supply the public goods and services at point C in which higher prices are 
charged alongside with lower amount of provision. Moreover, relying on his 
conjecture, monopolistic bureau is expected to experience lower MC levels, which is 
not in tune with the conventional analyses on bureaucracy.         
 
Figure-1 
Bureaucrats and Politicians 
         The abovementioned arguments on the theory of bureaucracy were lacking of 
the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians who both choose and implement 
policies (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007). Even though the link between these two 
significant players in the policy-making attracted the attentions of researchers many 
years ago, first economic insight belongs to Rogoff (1985) who particularly focuses 
on the decision-making process for monetary policy. In the related paper (1985), he 
claims that non-elected central banker with independent and inflation-averse 
characteristics would enhance social welfare.  
         Departing from preceding literature on the bureaucracy-politics relationship 
based upon principle-agent models (Maskin and Tirole, 2001; Schultz, 2003; Besley 
and Ghatak, 2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2007) states that “bureaucrats are 
preferable to politicians in technical tasks for which ability is more important than 
effort, or if there is large uncertainty about whether the policymaker possesses the 
required abilities to fulfil his task”. Moreover, they conclude that the policies 
encompass “highly technical tasks” need to be handed over to the high-skilled public 
employees particularly in monetary policy, regulatory policies and public debt 
management.  In addition to the aforementioned statements, Alesina and Tabellini 
(2008) extend their arguments in their following paper with certain propositions. They 
reveal the fact that bureaucrats are anticipated to perform better than politicians if “the 
criteria for good performance can be easily described ex ante, and are stable over time 
(...), the policy consequences touch narrowly defined interest groups and good 
performance can be easily formulated and assessed in terms of efficiency”.       
IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE EFFICIENCY OF 
PUBLIC PROVISION OF SERVICES  
Institutional framework for the public provision of goods and services starts with 
a generic question: “To what extent other forms of institutions may either be for-profit 
and not-for-profit, are capable of providing public goods and services in lieu of public 
sector organizations?” (Weisbrod, 1988). And accordingly, this particular question 
stimulates both empirical and theoretical researches so as to comprehend the possible 
failures/weaknesses as well as strengths of public provision of goods and services 
concerning particularly the efficient allocation of resources. The application of 
heterogeneous demands of consumers (Weisbrod, 1998) and the incentive schemes 
(Dixit, 2002; Burgess and Ratto, 2003;Ben-Ner, 2006) are frequently visited 
references in the papers working on the institutional analysis of provision of public 
goods and services, which have significant insights on the efficiency literature of 
public sector organization. 
It is obvious that not only consumers but also suppliers have preferences and 
priorities among institutional forms including private, public and non-profit sector in 
relation to the provision of public services. Weisbrod (1988) argues that as long as the 
regulation of non-profit organizations (NPOs) is easier than regulation of 
outputs/production process/distribution of output carried out by public institutions in 
production of collective goods, than NPOs become more attractive to provide that 
particular fragment of public service provision. Moreover, heterogonous demands 
among the collective goods cause an institutional bifurcation between non-profit and 
public sector. That is to say, whilst public sector is more preferable in the markets 
where consumers have homogenous demand, heterogeneous demands of society in 
particular sectors necessitates non-profit sector to meet the needs of this sort of 
consumer choice (Weisbrod: 1988).  
The chief argument on the inefficient usage of resources within public sector is 
interrelated with the trade-off between incentive schemes and efficiency performances 
of public sector organizations. In the mainstream microeconomics literature, public 
organizations are seen as inefficient entities as there is a lack of appropriate incentive 
scheme within them. To Burgess and Ratto (2003) “explicit incentive contracts in the 
form of performance-related pay have always been more common in the private 
sector than in the public sector, but the issue of incentivising the public sector is 
relatively recent”, hence the incentive-orientated policies are encouraged to be put 
into action to overcome this structural obstacle for the efficient allocation of 
resources. From a different perspective, Dixit (2002) argues that sharing a set of 
“idealistic or ethical purpose” incentivises public sector employees, and subsequently 
motivates efficiency performances in a better way. The reference papers indicated 
above enumerate a number of points that impact on the incentive structure in the 
public sector organizations either in a good or bad way: 
a. Multiple Principals (Both) 
b. Multiple Tasks (Dixit) 
c. Measurement and Monitoring Problems (Burgess and Ratto) 
d. Lack of Competition (Dixit) 
e. Teams in production and rewards (Burgess and Ratto) 
f. Intrinsic motivation (Burgess and Ratto) & Motivated agents (Dixit) 
g. Consequences (Dixit) 
On the other hand, Ben-Ner (2006) argues that both non-profit and public sector 
organizations face more obstacles for operating in the efficient levels than for-profit 
counterparts. That is to say, if these organizations were to produce identical goods in 
the same circumstances, for-profit firms would be quite advantageous to be more 
productive than their rivals in the public and NP sector. After stating this, he points 
out that several contingencies like ‘size of communities, educational attainment of 
consumers, and extent of social capital’ do influence the comparative degree of 
efficiency in public and non-profit organizations. On the contrary, Borzaga and 
Bacchiega (2003) assert that NPOs would perform well in the provision of personal 
and collective goods that aren’t provided by for-profit and public organizations 
efficiently due to two main reasons: firstly, these services usually entail market and 
contractual failures, and secondly, ‘a certain degree of redistribution from financiers 
to consumers’ might be needed for production to start.  
In the current literature, one of the components of the comparison between NPOs 
and public sector organizations is contingent upon the cost efficiency of service 
provisions. This notion stresses the reality that means of income redistribution per se 
encompass both production and distribution costs. That is to say, if a certain 
institution is devised to perform redistribution, that institution will include 
administrative/bureaucratic costs to be able to keep up its operations. Arthur Okun 
(1975) clarifies this argument with “Leaky-Bucket” experiment as follows: 
“However, the program (for income redistribution) has an unsolved technological 
problem: the money must be carried from the rich to poor in a leaky bucket. Some of 
it will simply disappear in transit, so the poor will not receive all the money that is 
taken from the rich”. Hence, an organization with more complicated administrative 
structure and bureaucracy is expected to be more inefficient than its less bureaucratic 
counterpart. Advocates of NPOs to supply welfare/public services are mostly 
triggered off this cost efficient structure of NPOs (Robinson, 1997; Hulme and 
Edwards, 1997). Estelle James (1990) proposed that thanks to less bureaucracy, lower 
staff salaries and reliance on volunteers, NPOs could offer more efficient service 
delivery than their public sector counterparts through reducing the costs in a dramatic 
way. However, one needs to keep in mind that these arguments aren’t elucidating the 
ambiguity on quality levels of cost-reduced products and/or services.  
V. CONCLUSION 
After introducing the theoretical framework on the efficiency of public sector, this 
paper examines the economic theory of bureaucracy that is seen as the major source 
of inefficient allocation of resources in the public sector organizations. Besides, 
alongside with the earlier Weberian (1947) and Downsian (1965) interpretation of 
bureaucracy, alternative perspectives on bureaucracy including contemporary debate 
on the efficient role of politicians and bureaucrats in the policy-making is visited 
referring to the recent papers of Alesina and Tabellini (2007; 2008). Lastly, 
institutional framework for the provision of goods and services is presented to have a 
comparative understanding of public sector organizations vis a vis their non-profit and 
private counterparts.  
Initially in the paper, theoretical framework working out the efficient or 
inefficient allocation of resources within public sector is revealed alongside with the 
methodological and practical challenges to measure the efficiency performances of 
this set of organizations. Besides, first stream of empirical papers stimulating the 
subsequent analyses are enumerated. An extensive literature on the efficiency of 
public higher education institutions is reviewed in the paper V and VI respectively. 
The relationship between the theoretical approaches on the efficiency of public sector 
and empirical findings of this research is uncovered in the paper V and paper VI 
through which efficiencies of public universities in Turkey are measured. 
Last but not least, institutional perspective on the public provision of services is 
illuminated focusing firstly on the dichotomy among incentive structures and 
efficiency performance. Moreover, the comparisons between public and private as 
well as public and non-profit sectors are performed regarding to the approaches of 
heterogonous demand, incentive schemes and cost efficiency.      
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